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1.  exeCuTive summary
The main objective of the SeBoCom project was to define the way to proceed to a further and 
complete study. This task was to be achieved through this pre-study and through a Workshop 
involving end-users to stimulate the discussion and gain the input regarding their needs.
The issues related to the collaboration of different forces, within the same Member State and 
from different Member States, aimed at securing the EU border against the present threats 
have already been analyzed in several previous studies.
However, there is a need for a study that will aim at bringing together operational and 
technical knowledge to help providing the European Border Forces with effective, reliable, 
easy to use communications infrastructure capable of secure, end-to-end delivery of voice 
and data.
This study has already collected some initial data on the present Communications 
infrastructures outlining the co-existence of many different systems, some already based on 
digital technology, others outdated or quite obsolete.
One of the key finding of the present study is the need to define joint procedure to manage 
communications among different bodies belonging to different Member States: the most 
reliable and secure telecommunication infrastructure will be useless if there is no agreement 
on the type and structure of communications that are transmitted over the infrastructure.
The full fledged study will have to:
Create and populate a database of the existing telecommunications infrastructures;• 
Identify operational scenarios for different contexts which gain consensus from all • 
interested organizations;
Identify operational requirements focusing on the specific needs of Border Security in the • 
perspective of the present technological state of the art and the legacy systems still in 
use;
Establish a permanent forum, managed by Frontex that officers from the relevant • 
organizations can use to share views and reach consensus on operational procedures.
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2.  inTroduCTion
2.1  Communications: the key enabler for Field Operations
Communications allow operators to coordinate their actions to be more effective in perform-
ing their tasks; therefore communications are a key factor for the successful execution of any 
organized operation. 
When we refer to a communication system we consider it as a whole, therefore we include 
both the wired and the wireless part of it, the wireless part often being the more needed and 
critical one.
In routine operations of any organization, the communication system is tuned to the average 
needs by daily usage: the staff in charge of the communication system has a continuous feed-
back on the system and users learn the workaround to overcome the most annoying defects of 
the system.
The situation changes dramatically if an emergency situation stresses the performance of the 
system or if it is required to integrate the stand alone communication system of an organiza-
tion with the ones of other organizations.
The worst case is when the two situations mentioned in the previous paragraph happen at the 
same time.
A further bit of complexity may be added if the emergency situation occurs in a foreign coun-
try where infrastructure may or may not be available and the spectrum occupancy may be 
fairly unknown.
The lack of interoperability among the different communication systems is usually pointed 
out as the most hampering factor in joint emergency operations: this is obviously true, but to 
reach a real solution to this problem it is necessary to be aware that procedures for exchang-
ing information, and a peer to peer relationship, must be established at the appropriate level 
before the operation is initiated.
It is clear that to allow different Bodies from different Member States to work together there 
are difficulties at different levels:
Political;•	
Law and regulations;•	
Procedures;•	
Language;•	
Technical.•	
Each level requires to be managed and a proper solution needs to be found.
To tackle, at least the procedural and technical levels, it is necessary to:
Define procedures accepted by all the players involved in the joint operations (such •	
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procedures should also consider the exchange of possibly classified information over a 
network that may be used also by NGOs without any formal clearance);
Find technical solutions, such as gateways, to allow different organizations to communi-•	
cate maintaining the use of their equipment (avoiding training issues for in field opera-
tors);
Train the operators to perform their duties in joint operations in such a way that they •	
become familiar with this, otherwise, unusual environment.
2.1.1  Operational aspects
It is necessary to differentiate various scenarios that may occur in an emergency operation 
using different categories.
Scenarios can be differentiated by:
Environment:•	
Existing (non existing) infrastructure	◊
Available spectrum	◊
Threats	◊
Orography	◊
Number and type of involved organizations•	
Military/non military	◊
Public safety	◊
NGOs	◊
Same Country/different Countries•	
Language problems	◊
2.1.1.1  Environment
It is important to know in advance the situation of the area where the operation will be car-
ried out, both to use it or to avoid interferences.
It would be advisable to prepare and maintain a database of the existing communications 
infrastructures in the Countries where an intervention may be foreseen.
The possibility of using an existing infrastructure  can greatly reduce the set up time of a 
communication network, but small issues like the kind of electrical power available or the 
available interface in the existing network (as an example the availability of T1 interfaces 
rather than E1) can jeopardize the use of the existing infrastructure.
The unavailability of the frequency band used by the communication systems used by the de-
ployed organization, may completely disrupt the operation, while in case of a very disastrous 
event the lack of any communication whatsoever may be exploited in the short time by using 
the so called “GSM in a box” networks that can provide immediate GSM coverage as well as 
hooking up to a satellite and giving instantaneous communication with the rest of the world.
Dense urban environments or very hilly territories make, obviously, a lot of difference in the 
establishment of a radio network compared to a flat suburban area.
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Similarly, being in a hostile environment with a significant possibility of attacks on transmit-
ting equipment may suggest the use of very specific radio equipment (frequency hopping and 
spread spectrum).
Beyond the purely communications related aspects, all the logistic and safety aspects have to 
be considered when operating in a disaster scenario.
2.1.1.2  Organizations
The interaction between different types of organization may require a very careful handling 
of the access to the communication media as well as information.
Military organizations do not, generally, agree to share their networks even with security 
forces, let alone with civilian NGOs. In such a case it will be mandatory to have different 
infrastructures connected by secure gateways.
If the number of organizations and Countries involved increase, the scale of problems to be 
solved at organizational level greatly increases and the technicalities of interoperability be-
come irrelevant.
2.1.1.3  Countries
If more Countries are involved, once all the major relationship problems have been solved 
and the chain of command has been established, we still have the language barrier.
2.1.2  Technical aspects
When people think of the problem faced by operators in the field, in terms of interoperability, 
the most mentioned issue is: over the air interoperability [air interface].
It is necessary to understand that although it may appear “nice” to have over the air interop-
erability, it is, actually, not that important because there are other cheaper ways to allow 
different entities to communicate: for example through gateways.
Gateways allow different entities to use their own networks and their own equipment within 
the organization while they also allow the communication to be bridged to other networks.
Most systems, commonly used, such as TETRA already have provisions for such need: it is 
obviously necessary to prepare the operation in advance in order to allow the communication 
experts to activate and connect such gateways.
Software radios are often depicted as the solution to interoperability problems; it is impor-
tant to be aware that a Software Radio able to download a different waveform, common 
among the different forces operating in the field is still far from being commercially available 
at a reasonable price and, anyway, the organizations working in the field will have to sched-
ule the purchase of these equipment and this will happen only when the present ones will be 
phased out, at the end of their lifecycle.
At technical level there are many other issues to be addressed, such as:
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Security:1.	
Encryption•	
Right of access (authentication)•	
Interconnection of different entities (Military, Police, Emergency services, NGOs, etc.)•	
Reliability:2.	
Reversionary modes•	
Back-up systems•	
Networks interconnections•	
Satellite/GSM/UMTS/WiMax/WiFi, etc.•	
Services:3.	
Voice•	
Traditional calls	x
Direct mode	x
Group calls	x
VOIP	x
Data (Real time/ non real time)•	
Electronic messaging (SMS, MMS, Email).	x
Access, switching, and rebroadcast of real-time video sources to field resources.	x
Transmission of complex data structures 	x
Transmission of user and patient monitoring telemetry.	x
Transmission of geographical location data (Galileo)	x
Transmission of streaming data (full-motion video, still photographs, images, 	x
sounds).
System of systems:4.	
System integration and interoperability•	
Transparent network and system access.•	
Over the air interoperability•	
Spectrum management•	
Network interoperability (Gateways, connections, etc.)•	
Network of sensors•	
C•	 4I
Database integration•	
Interferences •	
Technologies:5.	
Software Radio•	
Gateways•	
TETRA/TetraPol•	
GSM/UMTS/WiMax/WiFi•	
Ad Hoc Networks•	
Satellite communications•	
Safety (radiated transmission power):6.	
Work safety of personnel•	
EMC•	
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2.1.2.1  Security
Security is a relevant aspect of a communication network for Border Surveillance operations. 
There are many different techniques to guarantee the security of a Network, both for the 
wireless and for the wired part of it; therefore it is feasible to provide end-to-end security for 
any kind of connection.
Unfortunately when different organizations are involved, even if they have the same “level” 
of security and even the same type of equipment, the interactions at political level between 
the different Security Agencies are difficult and they often require an advanced planning.
Encryption is one of the key factors required to ensure the security of a communication 
network and encryption keys need to be exchanged among the different organizations in ac-
cordance with pre-defined procedures and each organization has to trust the others on the 
procedural aspects.
The complexity of the problem, also at technical level increases when organizations with 
different internal levels of security (Military, Police, Emergency services, NGOs, etc.) need to 
co-operate, because the interconnection among the different networks must be able to cater 
for different levels of security and that should be provided through Right of access (authenti-
cation) at different levels.
2.1.2.2  Reliability
Any system taken to the limit of its capacity and operated by personnel under stress may 
happen to fail; communications being crucial to the effective execution of Border Control 
operations, it is pivotal that the communication systems for Border Security are intrinsically 
designed to be reliable; this includes the provision for Reversionary modes.
Reversionary modes are operating modes used by a system when failures make the system un-
able to be fully operational; a good system, even under some sort of failure, should be able to 
automatically switch to a (reversionary) mode that will provide the best possible service, in 
the specific situation, to the user.
Good practice to increase the system reliability is also to provide a back-up system, but such 
systems should also be designed to provide interoperability.
In communications, an excellent approach to reliability is the creation of a meshed network 
of networks in order to provide many possible paths to each end to end connection; obviously, 
also in this case, each network should be able to provide the minimum required characteris-
tics for security, etc.
In order to further improve the resilience of the communication system it is advisable to uti-
lize networks using different technologies and different frequencies, such as satellite/GSM/
UMTS/WiMax/WiFi, etc.
2.1.2.3  Services
Communications for security forces, such as Border Security, require a number of different 
services; they can be grouped in the following three categories:
Voice1.	
Data (Real time / non real time)2.	
Streaming3.	
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2.1.2.3.1  Voice
Voice calls can be further categorized as follows:
Traditional calls•	
Direct mode•	
Group calls•	
VOIP•	
Traditional voice calls are generally provided by any phone system, while direct mode calls 
are established directly between two terminals without using any Base Station, they are 
required in case of operation outside the coverage area of the system or in case of failure of 
the network.
Group Calls are typical of single channel Private Mobile Radio, but they are very useful in 
operations and they are part of the mandatory characteristic of systems such as TETRA: they 
allow operators to be grouped in such way that it is possible to establish a call that connects 
the whole group so that everybody can listen when anybody else talks.
VOIP may be one of the key technologies for an all IP Network that, leveraging on the intrinsic 
interoperability provided by the Internet Protocol (IP), could foster the integration of net-
works and the creation of more resilient and interoperable communication systems.
2.1.2.3.2  Data
Data calls can be further categorized as follows:
Electronic messaging (SMS, MMS, Email)•	
Transmission of complex data structures •	
Transmission of user and patient monitoring telemetry•	
Transmission of geographical location data (Galileo)•	
These functions that are usually available on most public communication networks such as 
GSM or UMTS and can provide very valuable support to Border Secure Operations. It is anyway 
necessary to carefully evaluate their use in order to correctly size the capacity of the network 
and to define their use in the operational procedure.
As an example, SMS delivery within a specified time frame, in GSM Networks, is not guaran-
teed, as anybody had surely experienced; therefore a correct procedure should forbid their 
use in circumstances that require timely guarantee delivery.
2.1.2.3.3  Streaming
Also the streaming functions, such as the ones listed below, are easily available on commer-
cial systems and they can be very useful in field operations:
Transmission of streaming data (full-motion video, still photographs, images, sounds).•	
Access, switching, and rebroadcast of real-time video sources to field resources.•	
But their utilization should be well defined in the procedures since they cause a significant 
load to the communication network and procedures should take into account that many 
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legacy networks are completely unable to support them.
2.1.2.4  System of systems
Nowadays, the integration of a large number of functions through communication systems, 
while providing the users a significant number of vital services, also makes them dependent 
on the correct operation of these systems of systems; moreover sometimes these systems are 
interconnected without paying enough attention to the need of operators in the field to have 
the services they need without being burdened by the hurdles of getting the systems to work 
together.
Thus it is crucial that the integration of systems is implemented focusing on the users’ need 
to have interoperability and seamless access to networks and systems.
Over the air interoperability, spectrum management, interferences are issues that must be 
carefully studied and solved to allow different systems to work together as well as in cross 
border operation. 
Networks of sensors could be greatly helpful in Border Surveillance as well as in other opera-
tions, but their deployment and their integration in the communication networks must be 
well planned and elaboration nodes should be introduced since the distribution of raw data 
from sensors to operators may not only overload the communication networks, but may also 
flood the users with raw data rather than provide them with information.
2.1.2.5  Technologies
The following is a non exhaustive list of communication technologies that are, presently, con-
sidered suitable to be used in an interoperable communication system for Security Forces or 
to be used to facilitate interoperability:
Software Defined Radio (SDR): is a technology aiming at implementing all the characteris-•	
tics of a radio “waveform” in software having a “standard” platform, waveform denoting 
not just the time-dependency of the radio wave but all the characteristics of the radio 
communications protocol. The expected advantage of SDR is the possibility of implement-
ing different radio standards on the same hardware to allow the Software Radio to be 
compatible with legacy system as well as with new generation systems; SDR is also ex-
pected to host different waveforms at the same time, thus being able to act like a bridge 
between to different radio system providing over the air interoperability;
Gateways: are equipment capable of bridging two or more networks, they are usually •	
satisfactory in bridging voice calls, but they are often not capable of providing the full set 
of features across the networks;
TETRA/TetraPol;•	
GSM/UMTS/WiMax/WiFi;•	
Ad Hoc Networks;•	
Satellite communications.•	
2.1.2.6  Safety (radiated transmission power)
Safety issues are twofold, they are relevant for the personnel using the equipment and to the 
people living or temporarily staying in the proximity of transmitters such as Base Stations. 
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Usually there are strict safety rules regarding the limits to the radiated power of every trans-
mitter in relation to the distance of human beings as well as their exposure time.
It is necessary to pay attention also to different rules set in different countries, especially for 
the ones that are not EU Members: during joint operations, it can happen that partners use 
transmitters well above the safety threshold; while conducting operations abroad it is neces-
sary to avoid interfering with local wireless services (communications, radars, etc.). Thus a 
good knowledge of the radiation pattern of one’s own equipment is needed to be sure of abid-
ing by the EMC regulation of the hosting country.
2.1.3  Consideration
As a rule, most of the issues can be technically addressed if agreement is reached on the 
related political questions.
If such issues are not solved and it is required that the technical solution is open enough to 
accommodate any possible political choice, then too many options remain opened and the 
problem, from the technical point of view, becomes quickly too complex.
The issue of secure communications between different organizations working together in an 
emergency situation is crucial.
There is no single solution for every situation; it is very important to identify the different 
operational scenarios in order to select the most effective solution.
Advance knowledge of the environment to be faced in the field would be very helpful in the 
definition of the specific solution and in its implementation.
Training of the communications experts and of the personnel is mandatory to allow them to 
successfully operate in crisis situation.
No technical solution will be effective if the mission had not been prepared at political level 
(procedure, chain of command, permission of access to services and data, etc.).
2.2 Border Security Forces in Europe1
Border Guard and Coast Guard Services, Police Forces, Border Police, Customs, Airport Police 
are some of the different authorities in the Member States that monitor the activities on and 
through the external borders of EU.
The description of the existing situation gives more than 50 authorities under more than 30 
Ministries only for the “blue borders” (maritime). The Member States (MS) have undertaken 
actions to ensure the cooperation between the national authorities as well as the coordina-
tive approach concerning external borders security. 
Under these circumstances, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Coop-
eration at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) was 
1   All the information contained in this paragraph are extracted from the FRONTEX website: http://www.frontex.
europa.eu/
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established by Council Regulation (EC) 2007/2004. It is a specialized and independent body 
tasked with coordinating the operational cooperation between Member States in the field of 
border security. 
Frontex focuses on six principal areas: Carrying out risk analysis; Coordination of operational 
cooperation between Member States; Assistance to Member States in circumstances requiring 
increased technical and operational assistance; Providing Member States with the necessary 
support in organizing joint return operations; Assistance to Member States in the training of 
national border guards; Following up the development of research relevant for the control 
and surveillance of external borders.
In order to enhance this cross-border and cross-sectoral cooperation and coordination, Fron-
tex took the following initiatives.
First, it established the “European Patrol Network” (EPN), which is a permanent regional 
border security concept that enables the synchronization of national measures of the Member 
States and their integration in joint European activities. It introduced the National Coordi-
nation Centers (NCCs). As explained before, most MSs have, (regarding the borders), two, 
three and more authorities responsible for the surveillance and security. So, it is needed to 
have one point per MS in order to have better coordination. This is the National Coordination 
Center (NCC). Except of that EPN increased the systematic patrolling in Patrolling Areas. It 
extended the Joint Operational Areas and Frontex Joint Operations. Hera 2007, Nautilus 2007, 
Poseidon 2007, Pandora/ Minerva, Heracles, KRAS, Agelaus and Zeus are some of the Joint 
Operations Frontex coordinated previous years, jointly with the MS.
The second initiative was the establishment of CRATE and RABITs.
CRATE is a centralized record where the member states have enrolled their assets, which 
could be deployed under certain conditions. 
RABITs is a pool of experts from the Member States, trained by Frontex, that could be de-
ployed in joint operations in urgent and exceptional situations. 
The above mentioned is the present situation and the challenges faced regarding Border Secu-
rity Forces in Europe.
2.2.1   The communication landscape of Border Security Forces in 
Europe
2.2.1.1  Existing Situation
2.2.1.1.1  General
Border Guard Authorities are currently using a number of diverse and competing technologies. 
The diversities in the technological solutions create an interoperability problem at different 
levels that reduces the efficiency of the operating competent authorities within a Member 
State and much more in joint operations at a European level. 
Generally speaking, the market of “Border Security Communication” equipment is relatively 
small and mainly based on governmental funding. Consequently it increases the market frag-
mentation and equipment costs. 
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It is important in the early research stages to consider the development of interoperable and 
harmonized technologies. 
There is also, lack of research toward the use and optimization of existing technologies that 
will take into account public security users’ requirements and will be focused on heteroge-
neous multi-standard system approach.
The common European user requirements and scenarios must be considered in R&D process 
and has not been developed yet.
In many countries the level of penetration of data communications in border security com-
munication is very low. Border Guard user groups are still using, more or less, mainly voice 
communication. The promotion and further introduction of digital technologies for data com-
munication can dramatically increase the efficiency of Border Guard Officers.
2.2.1.1.2  Challenges
There are many barriers to allowing more ‘open’ access to information and communication 
systems. Often they are not technical but rely on the adoption of common language, process-
es and operating procedures.
Conflicting terminology and lack of trust are key disablers to information sharing. But what 
are the other obstacles? Barriers to the access of information are still present. How could 
they be overcome?
Is data ownership still a significant issue, and who is legally responsible for subsequent action 
once disparate sources of information are collated, analyzed and new conclusions drawn? 
There are also questions such as: Who is in control? Is the controlling entity reliable, safe and 
dedicated?
These questions are not meant to be all encompassing; they merely reflect a small number of 
the issues associated with authorization, authentication, security and access, which for the 
most part are being dealt with on an ad-hoc basis rather than through the adoption of cohe-
sive or standard approaches. 
2.2.1.1.3  The communications landscape
Several Member States use TETRA and much less use TETRAPOL. These systems are mainly 
used for voice communication and much less for data communication. In addition several 
Member States use interfaces and gateways in order to interconnect with the old analogue 
systems. The majority of MSs have no encryption in the analogue systems. They have the stan-
dard encryption in digital systems like TETRA / TETRAPOL with additional services like “group 
calls”, “Direct Mode” or “sensors connection”. Group calls are simply calls which more than 
one person can listen to. A direct mode call is sent directly from phone to phone, without go-
ing via base station, possibly needed in case of network failure. Sensors connection: a sensor 
can be connected to the digital port fitted to TETRA phones to send low-bandwidth informa-
tion from a sensor, for example, an alarm to indicate the presence of an intruder detected by 
an IR camera with intelligence.
The coverage of the “external borders” (land and sea) in most of them are very good (90-
100%).
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Furthermore, in most of the MSs different authorities involved in border security can com-
municate with each other through the above mentioned digital systems.  Communication 
between MSs regarding Border Security is rarer and it is done through hierarchical / official 
channels. Local border authorities sometimes do communicate with each other but unofficial-
ly, through conventional ways (e.g. telephone etc.). More important and critical needs arise in 
“Joint Operations” where there is an explicit requirement that the units in the field are able 
to communicate each other and, moreover, with the Coordination Centers (MSs / Frontex).
2.2.1.2  Technical aspects
Digital radio is governed by the same laws of physics and rules of propagation as is analogue, 
however, when reception is poor analogue fades gracefully but digital is either very good, or 
simply not there. 
Analogue users tolerated very poor broken signals and this may influence their perception of 
coverage. For digital users there is essentially no choice what to tolerate: once a 4% bit error 
rate is exceeded reception stops. Consequently digital voice quality, when available at all,  is 
excellent.
As with analogue the airwave digital signal will penetrate buildings and vehicles if there is 
sufficient external signal strength to make that happen. The use of different site locations 
leads to different propagation patterns. Finally the ‘good signal or no signal’ nature of digital 
radio needs to be understood by users.
From a technical point of view there are the following issues:
Limited air interface encryption.•	
Authentication and encryption can only be done by exchanging very important keys.•	
End-to-end encryption is a “question-mark”.•	
Possible use of modems and leased lines are necessary “costs”.•	
Multiple conversations from digital to analogue and back to digital reduce the audio qual-•	
ity.
In addition, attention should be given to configuration issues like radio configuration or net-
work configuration and to the logistical challenge of the large scale application of the pro-
posed solution.
The expectation is that the full Inter-System-Interface (ISI) answers to these questions and it 
will provide a structural maintainable and manageable European solution.
The following schema indicates advantages-disadvantages of each system in three param-
eters: coverage; functions; data.
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2.2.1.3  “What’s up” on Research and Development 
There are some ongoing pilot projects (The “three-country pilot project” for the ‘Cross 
Border Communication for Public Safety’, is a typical example regarding this topic, see also: 
www.3countrypilot.com) in existence in cross-border cooperation among several organizations 
in public security communications. In these projects it was proved that a communication flow 
model for cross-border communication was quite important.
Also, there was a review to what extent (with this technology) cross-border communication 
will be sufficiently supported in operational practice and whether improvements are still pos-
sible.
2.2.1.4  Communication Market 
Though the technologies are often similar, the “Border Security Communication” market is 
quite different from the public telecommunications market; for a start, it is much smaller in 
number of users and economical investment.
Improvements are restricted by the level of annual public budget set aside for scheduled pur-
chasing and maintenance in this field. 
This also implies that the new system has to be compatible with the old (both in terms of 
technical interoperability and be able to be operated following the existing organizational 
procedures). Furthermore, the operational costs must not be more expensive than today. 
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An initial set of topics for discussion includes: 
Identification of  the key aspects that define the structures and technologies through  →
which Border Security services are currently provided 
Find or build an analytical (but not too complex) model based on these components,  →
which can be used to calculate the costs for such systems 
Discuss if the model needs to be updated to be usable for a Europe system  →
Comparison and discussion of the differences. →
2.2.1.5  Maritime Scenario
A typical Maritime Joint Operation (JO) starts with its “Operation Plan”. It describes its Ob-
jectives, Execution and Co-ordination.
The Objectives are the “general objectives” of Frontex and the “main objectives” of the JO 
itself.
The Execution chapter of the plan defines issues such as: International Coordination Centers 
(ICC), tasks; Assets Employed; Area; Time; Course; Conduct of Operation. 
Regarding ICC, some of the topics that are being defined in the plan are such as: the man-
ning, the Director, the co-ordination board, the employed national officials, the command and 
control and finally the communications. 
The Communications must be according to international and national regulations in force of 
the competent agencies of participating EU MS. These communications include exchange of 
e-mails, fax and telephone.
They are often defined in attached annexes having the shape of a matrix table, as following:
Communication Table of JO ZZZZ  
 Participant MS  Name  Nick Name 
Call 
Sign 
MMSI 
Call  Telephone Fax  Email  
Inmarsat 
A  
Inmarsat B 
Telephone 
Inmarsat 
B Fax 
Inmarsat 
C VHF  MF/HF  Telex 
1 FOCC  MS x1               
2 ICC  MS y1               
3 NCC1  MS y2               
4 NCC2  MS y3               
5 Vessel1  MS y1               
6 Vessel2  MS y3               
7 Aircraft1  MS x2               
8 Aircraft2  MS y4               
9 Heli1  MS x3               
10 Heli2  MS y5               
 
Obviously, the communication means that the Units use in the field are of various technologies 
and capabilities. Having in mind that communications in an “Operation Plan” are essential for 
the success of a JO and more over the interoperability and security of those communications 
in the reality of a JO reflects in the effectiveness of assets and personnel.
2.2.1.6  Future Development / Future Situation
It is estimated that in the near future there will be a deployment of advanced broadband ap-
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plications, related radio technologies and modern IP-based system architecture. Further more 
the interoperable IP capable networks will be developed nation-wide and European wide. 
Progress will be in the following areas:
Enablement of Trusted End-to-End IP based Network Security. →
Enablement of IP based Network Management. →
Common open standards construction protocol to support multiple wireless networks con- →
figuration and integration (e.g. Sensor, Link, and Internet). 
Complex system would be less complex by modularity. →
A future shared system for communication across geographic and organizational limits shall 
offer the following features: 
Group and one-to-one communication. →
Fast call set up. →
Safety alarm call. →
Recording + logging of calls. →
Robust system that operates independent of other networks. →
Autonomous area working →
Direct communication terminal-terminal. →
Encrypted system — not possible to listen in. →
Also, one common “user terminal” will substitute many different terminals that are in use 
today (radio pager, mobile radio, GSM).
2.3  Broad view of the requirements
The user requirements for wireless interoperability in the border control domain can be di-
vided into two main categories:
requirements in normal daily operation;•	
requirements in crisis situations.•	
These two main categories differ in several aspects. The requirements under normal daily 
operation are much less stringent than under a crisis situation, when the system that enables 
wireless interoperability will come under significantly more stress. This higher level of stress 
is due to the increased number of users, who will most likely be part of even more diverse 
teams than usual. This may be because teams are transferred from other regions to assist in 
the emergency operations. Thus a wider range of wireless standards will need to be accom-
modated.
Apart from these two very basic parameters (number of users, number of different wireless 
standards), the rest of the requirements are similar in both daily operation and crisis situa-
tions.
The number, capabilities and locations of dispatch/coordination centers need to be studied, 
planned and drill-tested in advance. The number of dispatch centers may depend on the 
number of different languages spoken by the end-users, by the different levels of security 
clearance in play, and/or by the scale of the operation. The capabilities depend more or less 
on the same factors as above. Their locations may depend on the map of existing telecommu-
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nications and other infrastructures, on the morphology of the terrain as well as other factors.
Another important requirement often overlooked is call setup time, both in point-to-point 
(unicast), point-to-multipoint (multicast) and broadcast scenarios. While call setup times of 
several seconds are tolerated by commercial users, sub-second call setup times are required, 
even critical for public safety users, including border control agents.
Scalability of the infrastructure that achieves interoperability is important, mainly in crisis 
situations, but also in normal daily operation, as borders expand or more agencies come into 
play in the border control domain.
The system needs to be flexible and easily adaptable. This will come in handy when one of 
the agencies in play decides to upgrade its communication systems, or when new user re-
quirements come up and the infrastructure is asked to support them. The speed, ease and 
reliability with which parameters can be changed or new features introduced will make a 
difference in maintenance costs.
Reliability is of course a very important aspect that is easy to be defined, even measured, 
however it is not always as easy to be achieved, especially as systems become more and more 
complicated and we are moving steadily into a system-of-systems world. Hidden parameters 
come into play in such situations, and system behavior is not always deterministic, in the 
sense that small changes in input can make a major difference in results. The infrastructure 
needs to be designed to be fault-tolerant and accommodate components being replaced in 
real time, or nodes failing due to unpredicted reasons (by accident or sabotage). It is impor-
tant that the system is designed to have no single point of failure, and redundancy needs to 
be kept in mind.
Intentional sabotage needs to be anticipated, both in the physical domain (e.g. material dam-
age), in the support layer (e.g. power failures) or wireless layer (e.g. frequency jamming). 
These situations need to be reliably identified / isolated and different measures need to be 
taken in each of these cases.
System robustness is obviously crucial, since the system needs to be able to operate in ex-
treme temperature/humidity/vibration conditions or with unreliable power and communica-
tions infrastructures.
The cost effectiveness of the system is not to be overlooked, since often these agencies have 
limited budget, both for purchasing and maintenance. Any solution should strive to limit the 
costs of production, operation and repair. Standardization and modularity is certain to aid in 
this goal.
Ease of use is another common user requirement, as the equipment often needs to be oper-
ated under difficult, unpredictable and often stressful conditions. Equipment/system usability 
is often in competition with system flexibility/complexity. The system should integrate some 
level of intelligence, freeing the operator from the maximum possible number of obvious 
decisions/actions.
The Communication System for Secure Border Communications should reflect the following 
broad requirement:
Transparent and seamless wide-area network applications.•	
Multiple levels of security and data encryption schemes.•	
Robust operational management and control systems capabilities.•	
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Priority operational services and priority system restoration.•	
Provision of an extremely reliable service model and ubiquitous coverage within a user’s •	
defined service area.
Support for the transport and distribution of rate-intensive data, digital video, infrared •	
video and digital voice for both service-specific and general applications.
2.3.1  General technology-requirements
Some of the primary required capabilities of the communication system may include, but are 
not limited to, the following:
Full Duplex communication.•	
Compatibility with legacy systems.•	
Digital Data Communications.•	
Broadband.•	
Multiple levels of security.•	
Multiple levels of availability of service.•	
End-to-end network integrity.•	
Security requirements.•	
User Safety.•	
System and network access.•	
Economical and ergonomically friendly design.•	
Incorporation of frequency neutrality and/or agility.•	
Consistency with existing standards.•	
Compatibility with multiple international standards.•	
Spectrum efficiencies awareness.•	
Compliance with the need of the participating Member States.•	
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3.  meThodology
The present pre-study has been based on a twofold approach; on one side we have examined 
the existing studies on communications for Public Safety organizations, focusing on the lessons 
learned in emergency situations; on the other side we have circulated a questionnaire aiming 
at finding out the present technological level of the communication equipment used by Border 
Police in the Member States.
The analysis of the literature is outlined in chapter 4; such an analysis was not meant to be 
exhaustive, but to present the pivotal importance of communications in Border Police operations 
based on the analogy with other type of operations in critical situation.
Similarly the survey of existing studies was intended to show that there is a great deal of 
background knowledge on the topic of secure communications, but further work is necessary to 
harmonize the outcome of existing studies and to focus on the specific needs of Border Police 
operations.
The response to the questionnaire has been quite satisfactory showing a significant interest in 
the Member States.
The results of the analysis of the data collected from the answers to the questionnaires are 
described in the chapter “Learning from Questionnaires”.
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4.  daTa; survey of liTeraTure; ColleCTed daTa 
4.1  Learning from previous events
4.1.1  Introduction
In disaster or crisis situations, it is beneficial for law enforcement, rescue agencies and border 
security operators to have the ability to communicate and exchange information quickly 
and reliably. Since wired networks are not always available to security operators and maybe 
impractical, wireless networks are the ideal instruments.
The examples below point out to the fact that emergency wireless communications are of 
paramount importance in order to provide relief and save lives in national/international 
emergency and crisis situations.
However, it is also evident that problems arise whenever different operators from different 
contexts are called to cooperate in such emergencies.
 The situation becomes even more complex when international partners from different countries 
are involved, since the lack of coordination and standardization among wireless communication 
system is more severe than at the national levels where in many cases there are plans and 
contingency measures to improve communications in such scenarios. The examples below 
describe clearly how the lack of secure and reliable communications can affect negatively the 
emergency relief operations, in national and international contexts, in Europe, US and in the 
rest of the world where European forces might be involved.
4.1.2  London bombings, July 7, 20052
London bombings, July 7, 2005
Rescue teams were unable to communicate properly between the sites of the explosions • 
underground, colleagues at ground level and control rooms.
The lack of a digital radio network meant that many senior managers among the main • 
emergency services, and the London Ambulance Service in particular, were forced to rely 
on already-overloaded mobile phone networks to communicate in the aftermath of the 
explosions.
Communications failures had a direct impact on rescue efforts, with requests for further • 
ambulances, supplies and equipment by London Ambulance Service personnel at the scenes 
of incidents failing to get through to the main control room. They were also unable to 
receive instructions as to which hospitals were still receiving patients.
A report on the July 7, 2005, London bombings has said the lack of a digital radio network 
hampered the efforts of emergency service rescue teams.
2   The information used in this paragraph has been obtained from: “Communication failures hampered 
London bombing rescues, article” appeared on CNET www.news.com By Andy McCue: http://www.
news.com/Communication-failures-hampered-London-bombing-rescues/2100-7348_3-6079889.html as 
of 14-5-08
SeBoCom Pre-Study 
A preliminary study on
Secure Border Communications 25
Noting that rescue teams were unable to communicate properly between the sites of the 
explosions underground, colleagues at ground level and control rooms, the London Assembly’s 
July 7 Review Committee report3  said it is “unacceptable” that the emergency services are still 
not able to communicate by radio when they are underground, 18 years after the official inquiry 
into a fire at King’s Cross station recommended action to address the problem.
“It is essential that London’s emergency services are equipped with digital radio equipment so 
that they no longer have to rely on mobile telephones to communicate between the scenes of 
major incidents and the control rooms,” the London Assembly report concluded.
The scale of the mobile network overload is revealed in the report. Vodafone, for example, 
experienced a 250 percent increase in the volume of calls and a doubling of the volume of text 
messages. Across all networks on July 7, 11 million calls were connected--60 percent more than 
usual. This figure doesn’t include unsuccessful calls.
Despite this network overload, the emergency services did not invoke the Access Overload 
Control (ACCOLC) system—apart from a 1 kilometer-square area around the Aldgate incident—
which allows mobile network access only to the police, fire and ambulance personnel.
One of the reasons ACCOLC was not activated was that key emergency services personnel who 
were not carrying specially enabled telephones would not have been able to make or receive 
any calls.
“This is clearly a major flaw in the system: There is no point in having the technology to enable 
key people to communicate with each other if the relevant authorities do not make sure that 
the right people are in possession of that technology,” the London Assembly report said.
The report also criticized London Underground’s “antiquated” radio systems after they failed to 
work on any of the three affected tube trains on July 7, preventing direct communication from 
the trains to either the emergency services or Transport for London’s control center. 
4.1.3  World Trade Center Attack4,5,6
World Trade Center Attack, New YorkS City, September 11, 2001
As live images of the unfolding events of September 11, 2001 were broadcast on television, • 
many police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel who were called to duty 
in New York City could not use their wireless systems to communicate with one another.
After the south tower collapsed, police helicopters relayed a message for public safety • 
officials to evacuate the north tower
3  “Report of the 7 July Review Committee,  Greater London Authority, June 2006”
4   The information used in this paragraph have been obtained from: “The lessons  of non-interoperabili-
ty in public safety communications systems”, Donald A. Lund April 2002, the ATLAS project, Advanced 
technology in law and society, University of New Hampshire USA
5   Steve Worrall (2005). An International Study of Radio Interoperability, steve.worrall@shropshirefire.
gov.uk
6   Protecting Public Safety With Better Communications Systems” Jon M. Peha Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity IEEE Communications, March 2005
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Firefighters never received the police warning because their radio system did not interoperate • 
with the police communication system.
The worst failure occurred in the World Trade Center’s North Tower. At 9:59AM on September 
11, 2001, the first of several announcements was transmitted to emergency responders ordering 
them to evacuate the North Tower. Police inside the building heard the order on their radios, and 
most left safely. However, firefighters were using incompatible communications equipment that 
could not receive the order. People watching television at home knew that the unimaginable 
had already occurred - that the World Trade Center’s South Tower had collapsed - but many 
firefighters inside the North Tower would never learn of this. When the North tower fell 29 
minutes after that first evacuation order, 121 firefighters were still inside. None survived. At 
the same time, two hundred miles away, more communications failures were making it harder 
to contain fires at the Pentagon, where another plane had crashed. These failures put more 
lives at risk.
In his New Jersey volunteer fire station, Glenn Corbett watched his colleagues desperately try 
to send emergency messages to the medical and fire personnel mounting rescue operations 
inside the Twin Towers. 
“It was such a tragedy to see the battalion chief of the first battalion and the first fire chief on 
the scene of the Trade Center trying to communicate with other officers up in the building and 
we saw on national television, where there was no answer. He kept calling and calling and there 
was no answer,” he said. 
Corbett, like many others, lost friends that day, Chief Raymond Downey and firefighter Andrew 
Fredericks. In all, the New York Fire Department suffered tremendous losses on September 11, 
with 343 firefighters killed. 
The Incident Command Post was located across from the South Tower, so when it collapsed 
the post was destroyed. This made it even harder to communicate and coordinate with rescue 
teams inside the towers. Mobile radios did not work properly even after rescue workers tried 
to use repeaters to boost signals. 
Congested and fragmented spectral resources, inadequate funding for technology upgrades, 
and a wide variety of institutional obstacles compromised the ability of public safety officials 
to protect life and property. The press attributed much loss of life among NYC firefighters to the 
malfunction of handheld radios in the Twin Towers. 
4.1.4  South Asian Tsunami 20047
South Asian Tsunami 2004
Controversy about Alert System• 
Difficulty to reach remote regions in order to find out about the situation there• 
Lack of coordination and communication among national/international aid/relief teams, in • 
particular European teams. 
The Indian Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 caused devastation on an almost unprecedented 
7   The information used in this paragraph have been obtained from: “Mobile Information and Com-
munication Systems in Crisis Situations” Presentation by  EPFL (MICS) Jacques Panchard: jacques.
panchard@epfl.ch http://www.terminodes.org and IISc HS Jamadagni: hsjam@cedt.iisc.ernet.in 
http://www.iisc.ernet.in
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scale, killing an estimated 200,000 people and leaving hundreds of thousands more homeless 
and in urgent need of water, shelter and medical treatment throughout south-east Asia and as 
far away as east Africa.
Following the experience of the tsunami, civil society gave a clear signal that it wished to see a 
stronger and more effective European response to disasters. A number of initiatives have been 
taken to address limitations in the system. In April 2005, the Commission issued a Proposal 
for a Council Regulation establishing a Rapid Response and Preparedness Instrument for major 
emergencies, to fund actions contributing to preparedness and response in case of disaster, 
as well as a Communication on Improving the Community Civil Protection Mechanism. This 
was followed in January 2006 by a Proposal for the Council Decision establishing a Community 
civil protection mechanism (recast); subsequently enacted through the Council Decision of 8 
November 2007 [2007/779/EC,Euratom] establishing a Community Civil Protection Mechanism.
Quoting an excerpt for the proposal for council regulations: 
“To that effect, the proposals build sup on the existing instruments while widening and setting 
out in more detail the actions eligible for funding. The range of actions that could potentially 
be financed under the proposal, in terms of preparedness and rapid response, is wide since the 
Instrument to be established could finance actions ranging from capacity building assistance, 
demonstration projects, awareness and dissemination actions to training and exercises, 
dispatching and sending out of experts and mobilization on short notice of adequate means and 
equipment. Particular attention has also been given to identify logistical support actions, 
such as secure communication systems and tools, which are necessary for the proper 
achievement of rapid response interventions.”
4.1.5  Germany Flood (2002)8
Germany Flood (2002)
More than 100,000 phone links were out of order.• 
Mobile network was overwhelmed. • 
Numerous problems with emergency services.• 
Heavy rains on 07–08 August 2002 caused severe flooding along the Moldau and Elbe Rivers, 
affecting the Czech Republic and Southeastern Germany.
Heavy rains in the Alps earlier that summer also contributed to the flooding.
Water levels peaked at 7.5 meters (m) and 9.4 m above average for the Moldau and Elbe Rivers, 
respectively.
The resulting floods devastated villages, towns, large areas of arable land, streets, roads, and 
industrial areas. Thousands of people were forced to leave their homes, and several hospitals 
were evacuated. The flooding strained the entire community, both during the emergency and 
in the long-term.
However, panic and chaos did not constitute a major problem.
8   The information used in this paragraph have been obtained from: KAMEDO Report No. 88:“Floods in 
the Czech Republic and Southeastern Germany, 2002” Ulla Näsman; Birgit Zetterberg-Randén; Helge 
Brändström (ed), KAMEDO = Swedish Disaster Medicine Study Organization
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A total of 48,000 inhabitants of the Czech capital of Prague were evacuated;
About 25,000 of them were elderly. Two urban districts in Prague were evacuated completely, 
mostly by bus. Evacuation centers were established in schools, student hostels, and military 
camps. Ten percent of those forced to leave their homes (about 5,000 people) took advantage 
of this opportunity.
The evacuation was so extensive that it was impossible to check if every house actually had 
been evacuated. It was up to individuals to decide whether or not to leave their homes.
16.08.2002: The Interior Ministry of the German Federal State of Saxony is calling upon people 
to reduce their mobile phone calls “to a minimum” in those areas affected by the flooding so 
as to keep the mobile network open for the emergency services. More than 100,000 terrestrial-
based phone links in the state of Saxony are still out of order, a fact that is adding to the strain 
upon the mobile network. 
4.1.6  Conclusion
In the quoted complex emergency/crisis scenarios a number of different first responders from 
different organizations are usually involved. 
Each organization, in turn is autonomous and independent from the others and in this respect 
usually adopts a wireless emergency communication technology based on its own internal 
requirements.
The communications needs become more complicated and multifaceted in the scenarios 
considered, due to the requirements for coordination among diverse parties.
Coordination in turn is also a very multifaceted issue that involves many technical and non 
technical aspects. However there are some pre conditions or enablers that must be satisfied in 
order for this process to take place.
The examples presented clearly point out a fundamental pre-requisite that is absolutely 
necessary for effectively exchanging information among diverse partners on the field. 
Interoperability of field-based radios together with connectivity with public networks (PSTN, 
cellular, IP/internet) is the most critical enabling factor that was not in place in the scenarios 
described by the example. It is important to notice that interoperability alone would not be 
sufficient for efficient coordination but it is a fundamental enabling factor in this case.
These examples point out that the effort to standardize a common wireless emergency 
communication system can be considered as a first essential step for inter-force coordination 
in crisis situations.
The difficulties involved in identifying a common standard can be overcome by the recent 
development of highly reconfigurable field radios. These radios have already found successful 
applications in the military field and the adoption of similar technology in the field of border 
security could represent an important step forward for bringing commercial success and hence 
reduction of costs to this promising technology.
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4.2  Learning from previous studies
4.2.1  SAFECOM9 
SAFECOM is a communications program of the Department of Homeland Security. SAFECOM 
provides research, development, testing and evaluation, guidance, tools, and templates on 
interoperable communications-related issues to local, tribal, state, and Federal emergency 
response agencies.
As an emergency responder-driven program, SAFECOM is working with existing Federal 
communications initiatives and key emergency response stakeholders to address the need to 
develop better technologies and processes for the multi-jurisdictional and cross-disciplinary 
coordination of existing systems and future networks.
SAFECOM harnesses diverse Federal resources in service of the emergency response 
community.   
SAFECOM, through its website provides members of the emergency response community and 
other constituents with information and resources to help them meet their communications and 
interoperability needs.
SAFECOM activity has clearly identified and progressed to meet the following needs:
A nationwide coordination for:• 
funding, x
technical assistance, x
standards development, and x
regulations affecting communications and interoperability;  x
a commonly agreed requirements for interoperability issues, SAFECOM published the • 
“Statement of Requirements which, for the first time, defines what it will take to achieve 
full interoperability and provides industry requirements against which to map their product 
capabilities;
the development of a national interoperability baseline;• 
the development of critical standards for interoperability;• 
the management of spectrum and regulatory issues;• 
the creation of  a model methodology for developing statewide communications plans.• 
SAFECOM has greatly helped in clarifying the needs of the Public Safety Community in terms of 
communication interoperability.10
The Interoperability Continuum is a framework that graphically depicts the five critical elements 
of interoperability success - governance, standard operating procedures, technology, training/
exercises, and usage of interoperable communications.
These critical elements must be addressed to develop robust interoperability solutions.
9   All the information contained in this paragraph are extracted from the SAFECOMM website: http://
www.safecomprogram.gov/SAFECOM
10   Wireless Technologies and the SAFECOM SoR for Public Safety Communications; Leonard E. Miller - 
2005
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This framework is to encourage a shift from a technology-centric focus to a comprehensive 
operational focus on the key interoperability success factors.
The Interoperability Continuum is a tool that can be used to assess the current level of 
interoperability and to determine what elements need further development.
Making progress in all aspects of interoperability is essential, since the elements are 
interdependent. Therefore, to gain a true picture of a region’s interoperability, progress along 
all five elements of the continuum must be considered together. For example, when a region 
procures new equipment, that region should plan training and conduct exercises to learn how 
to make the best use of that equipment.
4.2.2  Project MESA11
The Public Safety Partnership Project (PSPP), known as Project MESA (Mobility for Emergency 
and Safety Applications) was established between the Telecommunications Industry Association 
(TIA) of the United States and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).
The mission of the Project is to meet the emerging communications needs of Professionals in 
the area of Public Safety; such needs can be summarized as follow:
The next-generation public safety communications shall provide for broadband 
data access, interoperability, increased security, technical interoperability, 
user transparency and communications over myriad technological platforms and 
applications.
11   All the information contained in this paragraph are extracted from the MESA Project website: http://
www.projectmesa.org
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TIA and ETSI agreed to collaborate and combine work efforts to provide a cooperative forum in 
which key stakeholders (e.g., agencies, users and industry) can contribute to the elaboration 
of next-generation digital broadband data capabilities, initially focusing on public safety and 
emergency response agencies, organizations and professional users.
MESA was the first international communications standardization partnership project whose 
aim is to identify, coordinate and develop common mobile broadband data communications 
capabilities and specifications, based on continued input from the public safety and emergency 
response community, industry and research entities.
The development of future technologies will be driven by common scenarios, technical 
specifications, existing standards and spectrum allocations.
4.2.2.1  Statement of Requirements (SoR)
The initial Project MESA Statement of Requirements (SoR) was developed within the Service 
Specification Group of MESA and approved by the Project MESA Steering Committee in 2002.
It represents the first consolidated transatlantic vision to be expressed by critical 
public service users of advanced wireless data communications equipment and 
systems.
Capabilities, involving either an ad hoc or day-to-day operational environment, include:
Wireless mission-critical broadband data• 
Secure and interoperable capabilities• 
Multiple users with multiple applications • 
Self-establishing and -healing network nodes• 
IP-based mobile networking• 
Robust management and control systems• 
Flexible existing infrastructure dependence• 
Dynamic and flexible radio configuration• 
Real-time digital voice, video and sensing• 
Still photos, complex graphics and drawings files• 
Enhanced bio-telemetry information• 
Maintain integrity/security of national networks• 
4.2.2.2  MESA Technical Specifications
Based on the SoR, the MESA Technical Specification Group is now mapping existing capabilities 
and gaps, progressing toward the development of corresponding technical specifications.
A “System of Systems” approach is being utilized, leveraging current and evolving communications 
technology and user requirements. MESA output will be transposed by supporting standards 
development organizations (i.e., TIA, ETSI, etc.) for regional development and publication. 
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4.2.2.3  A Growing Market
The global demand for advanced communications tools and applications is growing 
significantly.
This broadband capability standardization process, involving current and next-generation 
technology, will lead to a defined multi-vendor global marketplace for MESA-capable products 
and services, benefiting from production volumes and reduced procurement costs for users and 
their organizations.
Project MESA is well on the way to developing coordinated technical specifications supporting 
the deployment of next-generation mobile broadband digital communications capabilities for 
public safety and emergency response applications.
Project MESA capabilities and resulting regional standards will be utilized in government-owned 
systems, government/ private sector partnerships or other appropriate uses, helping to grow 
the market, thus giving first responders the capabilities they need to serve and protect citizens 
from a local to an international level.
4.2.2.4  Communications on the Move
Recent wide-scale emergencies have made it clear that public safety and disaster response 
agencies need effective, high quality and reliable broadband communications services. 
Currently, voice communication is transmitted over narrow-band radios without benefit of 
advanced capabilities.
MESA-capable technology would allow first responders and command units not only digital voice 
communications but also utilization of streaming video feeds (e.g., visible/infrared) and real-
time data, including vital statistics, remote sensors, incident records and other information.
For example, consider large-scale emergencies where fire trucks, ambulances, police vehicles 
and surveillance helicopters are en route to the scene.
Electrical power is shut off in the area and worried citizens overload cell and wired phone 
systems.
With standardized wireless voice interoperability and MESA-capable equipment on board, all 
responding agencies/units will automatically establish full voice interoperability and a high-
speed wireless network as they approach each other. Incident planning can start before arrival 
at the scene.
Command units also are equipped with MESA-capable master nodes, including a satellite 
communications link for high-speed data back-haul on the way to and at the scene. The result 
is enhanced communications and response.
MESA will bring national, local and cross-border interoperability 
for coordinating responses to disasters and crises.
4.2.2.5  The Moving Hot-Spot
Densely populated urban areas and critical infrastructure areas will clearly be an avenue for the 
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deployment of next generation capabilities.
However, disaster can strike anywhere, so an important aspect of MESA-capable technology is its 
trans-jurisdictional mobility and rapid deployment as a totally independent yet interoperable 
service network.
The term “moving hot-spot” illustrates the unique network topology potential of MESA 
capabilities and its ability to support an effective ad hoc emergency response characterized by 
disrupted or non-existent public infrastructure and electrical supply.
4.2.3  Public Safety Communication Europe12
“Forum for Public Safety Communication Europe” has been established in order to facilitate 
consensus building in the area of public safety communication and information management 
systems.
The Forum invites users and policy makers, industrials (technology and service providers), 
research organizations and standard making authorities to reach consensus on: 
Consolidated user requirements, • 
Solutions for inter-operability of communication systems among users; • 
A R&D road map for future activities.• 
Guidelines for policy makers and regulators, indicating ways for the improvement of Global, 
European or National inter-operability through implementation of harmonized technologies 
and/or approximation of legal environments.
The Forum’s conclusions and recommendations will be put together in Memoranda of 
Understanding to be submitted to relevant authorities and representative bodies.
The Forum was launched on 1st June 2006 for an initial duration of 3 years.
4.2.3.1  The Problem
Recent events in Europe and other parts of the world have again demonstrated that effective 
response to emergencies, crises and disasters depends on timely available, reliable and 
intelligible information.
Advanced information and communications technologies (ICT’s) offer an increasing number of 
valuable, however divergent, tools for emergency response, crisis management, and disaster 
preparedness and response.
The speed with which ICT’s emerge, leads to different levels of implementation.
Successful application of ICT’s by the increasing number of national and international stakeholders 
confronted with cross-border incidents depends on better integration of frameworks for 
action.
12   All the information contained in this paragraph are extracted from the Public Safety Communication 
Europe website: http://www.psc-europe.eu/
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4.2.3.2  Purpose of the project PSC Europe
Stakeholders involved in these problems, namely:
users providing emergency and disaster response,• 
industry providing equipment and services,• 
researchers developing new ideas and concepts,• 
organizations defining standards for cooperation frameworks, will be brought together.• 
Convergence, at international level, of requirements formulated by each of them, is an essential 
goal of the project in order to lay the ground for possible solutions.
The project PSC Europe focuses on establishing and maintaining a Forum for regular exchange 
of ideas, information, experiences and best practices, and on seeking agreement among 
participating stakeholders.
4.2.3.3  Expected results
The conclusions and recommendations emerging from the Forum are expected to:
lead to convergence on user requirements,• 
propose solutions for inter-operability of communication systems among users,• 
supply an overview of available technologies and assess how they match user • 
requirements,
establish a R&D road map for future activities, hence ensuring European leadership in ICT,• 
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present guidelines for policy makers and regulators, indicating ways for the improvement • 
of global, European or national inter-operability through implementation of harmonized 
technologies and/or approximation of legal environments.
These conclusions and recommendations will be put together in Memoranda of Understanding 
to be submitted to relevant authorities and representative bodies.
4.2.4  Conclusions
The previous chapters highlighted the fact that Public Safety Agencies need to have flexible, 
secure, reliable, broadband Communications.
It is also clear that a great deal of effort has been made to produce a common set of requirements 
that will help the industry to design and produce communication systems capable of meeting 
the needs of the Public Safety community.
On the other hand, the effort of generating a common set of requirements has been, partly, 
hampered by competing interests and greatly dissimilar “environmental” conditions, i.e. the 
“landscape” of communications in the U.S. is significantly different from the E.U. one.
Moreover a number of different concurrent Projects started with the same purpose and, 
although they generated quite similar outputs, there are still a quite large number of different 
documents on requirements.
Furthermore, the drive for generality has produced requirements that could easily lead to the 
design of expensive systems that may not be affordable by many organizations.
It is therefore necessary to produce specific requirements that match the need of the Border 
Police, leveraging on the results of existing studies. 
4.3 Technology Survey
As mentioned earlier, Border Guard Authorities are currently using a number of diverse and 
competing technologies. It is necessary to study the current and emerging technologies that 
have the potential to facilitate interoperability among border control agencies.
Four different (but complimentary) approaches are put forward as possible solutions to the 
interoperability problem:
Reconfigurable (possibly SDR) Bridge Base stations1. 
Reconfigurable (possibly SDR) Terminals2. 
A Core Network Layer3. 
A common Wireless Standard (e.g. TETRA, TETRAPOL or APCO-25)4. 
4.3.1  Reconfigurable Bridge Base stations
The first approach calls for base stations that act as bridges between wireless standards. 
These base stations might be fixed (dispersed along the border) or portable (deployed in crisis 
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situations as needed). They would need to be reconfigurable, in order to accommodate the 
different standards and requirements in different scenarios. This re-configurability might be 
achieved through the Software Defined Radio architecture, but other solutions might come 
up in the future, so it would be prudent to keep open the possibility of incorporating such 
features.
This solution requires significant effort before deployment, as all possible wireless standards 
need to be implemented, tested and certified as waveforms in the reconfigurable base stations. 
These waveforms would need to be tested for interoperability with legacy radios of the same 
standard. In addition to that, a way to interconnect two or more waveforms would need to be 
devised. This interconnection mechanism would then need to be tested for enough combinations 
of waveforms. Moreover, concurrent operation of several waveforms in real-time would need 
to be tested, as well as the system’s ability to load/unload a waveform without disturbing the 
operation of other running waveforms. Finally, staff would need to be hired, trained in the use 
of these base stations and be placed on round-the-clock availability.
On the other hand, this approach has significant advantages compared to the other three. The cost 
of developing and deploying this solution is expected to be lower than, for example, replacing 
all terminals with new ones, especially if training is included. Furthermore, this solution is 
more centralized, and thus easier to manage, maintain and upgrade. This solution is also highly 
flexible, in the sense that it is easy to upgrade the base stations (increase performance) and 
add more waveforms or features. This would lower long-term maintenance costs and would 
make it easier to satisfy extra requirements that might come up in the future.
4.3.2  Reconfigurable Terminals
The second approach calls for reconfigurable terminals. These terminals would be assigned to 
key agents deployed in the field, who would be trained to use them and act as gateway nodes 
between different teams. The terminals would again be reconfigured according to the conditions 
at hand and the choice of teams that need to intercommunicate and be coordinated. As with 
the first approach, this terminal re-configurability could be achieved through the Software 
Defined Radio architecture, but other technologies for reconfigurable radios might emerge 
in the future, so again it would be wise not to predefine the technologies used to achieve re-
configurability.
This approach is more decentralized than the first one (reconfigurable bridge base stations). This 
fact reduces the complexity (both technological and procedural) and -as a result- procurement 
and maintenance costs. The re-configurability makes this approach also very flexible, however 
less than the reconfigurable base stations approach, mainly due to limitations in size, weight 
and power. New waveforms can easily be added as needed and upgrades are easier than in other 
cases.
An important disadvantage of this approach is the need to train the selected agents in the use 
and procedures related to the terminals. This increases the deployment cost and adds reliance 
on specialized personnel who can operate this equipment. Furthermore, it includes the same 
effort before deployment
4.3.3  Core Network Layer
In the third approach, a core network layer connects the base stations of the different border 
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control agencies and thus achieves interoperability in a centralized way. Several current 
technologies follow the core network layer paradigm:
Spain uses a network called SIRDEE (Sistema Integral de Radiodifusión Encriptada del Estado), 
which based on TETRAPOL technology
In the USA, ISSI (Inter RF Subsystem Interface) is part of the Project 25 (P25) or APCO-25 suite 
of standards
SCIP (Secure Communications Interoperability Protocol) was designed by the US DoD (Depart-
ment of Defense) in cooperation with the NSA (National Security Agency)
CISCO has developed IPICS (IP Interoperability and Communications System) for emergency • 
first responders
Ericsson has developed the CoordCom Public Safety Communication Center• 
Artevea has developed for NATO a system called T-MATRIX P, which stands for Transportable • 
TETRA over IP
The 3GPP standards body has designed IMS (IP Multimedia System), which uses SIP for call • 
establishment and IPv6.
Some advantages of the Core Network Layer approach are: a) it does not call for the replacement 
of current infrastructures, neither for terminals nor base stations, b) it does not require field 
agents to be trained on new technologies, and c) it is a centralized technology, which makes it 
easier to manage and upgrade. It is also probably the cheapest of all four approaches in terms 
of deployment and maintenance.
On the other hand, it bears a significant disadvantage: it does not enable interoperability 
among different radio standards in the same area, if the infrastructure (base stations) does not 
already exist. Instead it only enables interoperability between the existing, currently isolated 
infrastructures.
4.3.4  Common Wireless Standard
The fourth approach calls for a common wireless standard to solve the interoperability problem. 
In this scenario, user requirements from all the end-users are accumulated. An existing wireless 
standard satisfying all of them is chosen; otherwise a new wireless standard is developed. This 
new standard then replaces all the existing radios in the fragmented border security landscape. 
Of course, this approach would induce the highest cost of all other approaches. Furthermore, 
it would require agreement of all agencies on a common standard, something rather difficult, 
if not impossible. 
Another drawback in this approach is user training. Replacement of all user terminals means 
that all users need to be trained on the usage of the new terminals. This could be problematic 
for different reasons: a) people generally dislike change, so one might face resistance from the 
end users to adopting the new standard, b) border control agents need to be able to use their 
terminals instantly and intuitively, without stopping to read a manual or ask for guidance, and 
c) a common standard satisfying user requirements from different agencies would mean that 
the average user does not need many of the features in the new handset.
On the other hand, new wireless standards are usually more technologically advanced, so by 
replacing an old standard with a new one, end users would profit from the advantages of a better 
standard. Some of the improvements common in newer standards are: a) better spectrum usage, 
in the sense of higher bitrates’ using the same bandwidth, b) better encryption standards, and 
generally security mechanisms (immunity to interferences, authentication mechanisms etc), 
c) new terminals that use modern hardware modules lower the cost of the replacement parts 
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inventory compared to legacy platforms.
4.3.5  Combinations of approaches
Since each of the four approaches has its strengths and weaknesses, no one approach can 
resolve all the issues and satisfy all the users’ requirements. It is thus natural to examine the 
advantages and drawbacks of each approach and then design scenarios combining two or more 
of them in order to provide a technically feasible and financially viable solution. For example, a 
combination of SDR base stations interconnected with a Core Network Layer would combine the 
benefits of local area interoperability without the replacement of terminals (through the SDR 
base stations) in combination with wider-area interoperability through the Core Network Layer. 
Alternatively, a combination of reconfigurable terminals with a new wireless standard would 
allow key field agents from different agencies to communicate to each other (through the new 
wireless standard) while at the same time communicating with the rest of their team through 
the same terminal (as the terminal would be reconfigurable).
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5.  analysis of daTa 
5.1  General
In general, the EU must provide high and equal level of border security on its external borders. 
But, do we know how to measure a security level on border? Do we have sufficient – and 
sufficiently accurate, accessible and well-organized – data related to border security? The 
system that maintains border security is extremely important for MSs, expensive, and can be 
seen from various perspectives. In this paper we are focused on the perspective of wireless 
communication networks used at the EU borders.
On one hand the border wireless networks have to be interoperable, and on the other hand they 
have to be secure. Thus, the SeBoCom pre-study is aimed at an interoperability and security 
of the border wireless communication networks. Where the interoperability is the ability of 
a communication system to work with other systems without special effort, and security is 
focused on the threats related to the wireless networks. 
The part of this pre-study is wireless border communication survey based on questionnaires (see 
Annex 1) which were sent to each MS in December 2007. The survey is aimed at the functional 
and technical aspects of wireless border communication networks at the EU border. Eighteen 
MSs return completed questionnaires:
Austria,• 
Bulgaria,• 
Cyprus,• 
Dutch,• 
Estonia,• 
Finland,• 
France,• 
Greece,• 
Latvia,• 
Lithuania,• 
Luxembourg,• 
Poland,• 
Portugal,• 
Romania,• 
Slovakia,• 
Slovenia,• 
Spain, and• 
United Kingdom.• 
In the first two sections of the next chapter can be seen functional and technical aspects of 
the wireless border communication networks based on these questionnaires. The last section 
provides some conclusions and the directions for further work.
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5.2   The functionality of wireless border communication networks
5.2.1  The border security forces
The results of the questionnaires show that various border security forces in MSs are responsible 
for border security, such as border police, border guard, coast guard, military police, custom 
office, border and immigration agency, aliens and borders service, maritime police, and airport 
police. In various states, these agencies have different official names, mission, jurisdiction, 
organizational structure, and human resources. For example, the survey shows that the number 
of employee in these agencies varies from 40 to more than 16000. 
On the other hand, the border security forces need to cooperate with other organizations. 
The survey shows that the same wireless communication networks are used by border 
security forces and other organizations such as rescue centers, ministries of the interior, fire 
brigades, intelligent services, ambulance, ministries of finance, special police forces, and so 
on. Considering that border security systems are composed of many different organizations, 
which need to be closely related, providing the interoperable and secure wireless network is 
important and not always an easy task.
5.2.2   Information relayed through the national wireless border 
communication networks
Different MSs relay different types of information in wireless border communication networks. 
The analysis of questionnaires returned by MSs shows that most often are exchanged voice, 
operational data (status, messages, vehicle registration, criminal records or data files), 
geo-position data, video data, and data from surveillance sensors. In order to get a better 
picture about the relayed information types, the MSs are classified in groups in accordance 
with these information types in Table 1, which shows that the seven national wireless 
border networks support exchange of voice, operational data, and geo-position data. 
 
Information MSs 
Voice 
Operational data 
Video 
Geo-position data 
Surveillance sensors  
3 
Voice 
Operational data 
Geo-position data 
Surveillance sensors 
5 
Voice 
Operational data  
Geo-position data 
7 
Voice 
Operational data  
Surveillance sensors 
2 
Voice 
Geo-position data 1 
 
Table 1. MSs classified in accordance with information types relayed through the networks.
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5.2.3   Surveillance sensors connected to the wireless border 
communication networks 
The wireless border communication networks are mainly used for voice communications. 
Considering that wireless border communication networks can be extremely costly, the owners 
and users try to find alternative uses for them. Thus, various surveillance sensors can be 
connected to these wireless networks.
With Professional Mobile Radio (PMR) users can get a single interface to all alarms, regardless of 
where they came from. In this case all alarms are piped into PMR related alarm control system, 
logged, inspected and dispatched via PMR terminal to the on-call staff most appropriate to deal 
with the problem in question13.
The returned questionnaires show that the five national wireless border networks include 
surveillance cameras, and motion detectors; two MSs declare that their networks include 
ground sensors; and two MS networks include radars. The graph on Fig. 1 shows the number of 
MSs that include certain sensors in the wireless networks. 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Surveillance cameras and
motion detectors
Radars
Ground sensors (seismic and
magnetic sensors)
The number of MS using the sensors 
Fig. 1. Various sensors connected to the wireless border communication networks.
5.2.4   The services used in wireless border communication 
networks 
In general, a wireless communication technology provides different services, such as:
Group call•  that allows subscribers to communicate to multiple other subscribers at the 
same time.
Audio conferencing•  providing two-way voice calls between users and a predetermined 
group.
Broadcast call service•  that provides one-way voice calls from an originating user to one 
or more other users. The target user group may be a subset of all of the system users or it 
may be all of the system users.
Emergency call•  button that sets up a high-priority call to a dispatcher or a predefined 
group of users.
Direct mode•  that allows communication between two or more mobile stations, without 
involving a base station (walkie-talkie). 
13  ZONIT, TETRA Alarm Control System, http://www.zonith.com/products/tetra/, April, 2008.
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Push to talk•  (PTT) that provides direct voice communication connected with the push of a 
key. PTT is used to have a conversation with one person or with a group of people.
Global Positioning System•  (GPS) that provides location of wireless terminal with GPS 
detector.
Fast call set-up•  that is, a fast way to establish a connection. Time when call is set-up, 
typical for TETRA is less than 250 ms for a single node call, compared with the the many 
seconds that are required for a GSM network.
Ambience Listening that allows a dispatcher to place a radio terminal into Ambience • 
Listening mode without any indication being provided to the radio terminal user, which 
allows the dispatcher to listen to background noises and conversations within range of the 
radio terminal’s microphone. This is an important service to utilize for persons transporting 
important, valuable and/or sensitive material that could be ‘hijack’ targets14. 
The analysis of the questionnaires show the services mainly used in the wireless border networks 
of MSs (Fig. 2). The graph on Fig 2 shows that the group call, PTT, emergency call, direct mode, 
and GPS location are the most often used wireless network services. 
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Audioconferencing
Text and Data Messaging
MS
Fig. 2. Wireless communication network services used by border security forces.
5.3  Security
The results of questionnaires show that 15 MSs need to support different security levels of 
information relayed in their wireless communication networks. Therefore the networks need 
to provide different security functions designed to protect users’ information. In this paper 
we are focused on authentication and encryption (Air Interface Encryption and End to End 
14  TESS, Key Services, http://www.tess-me.com/tetrakeyservice.html, April, 2008.
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encryption). 
Mutual authentication is a service required to ensure that a wireless network can control access 
to it and for a radio terminal to check if a network can be trusted. Authentication - ensures 
only valid subscriber units have access to the system and subscribers will only try and access 
the authorized system.
Almost all MSs express a need for Air Interface Encryption or End-to-End Encryption in wireless 
border networks. The Air Interface Encryption protects all signal, identity and traffic across 
the radio link; End-to-End Encryption protects information as it is passing through the system. 
Considering the questionnaires 17 MSs use Air Interface Encryptions, such as TEA2, TEA3, and 
TEA1. Five of them also use End-to-End Encryptions, such as IDEA and AES.
In this survey we are focused only on authentication and encryption in wireless networks, but 
further studies need to take into account different categories of security function, such as 
security mechanisms, security management features, standard cryptographic algorithms, and 
lawful interception mechanisms15.
5.4   Technologies used in the wireless border 
communication networks
The questionnaires show that the wireless border communication networks are based on various 
technologies and sub-systems, such as:
PMR (Professional Mobile Radio)
TETRA (Terrestrial Trunked Radio)• 
TETRAPOL (Terrestrial Trunked Radio Police)• 
APCO25 (standards for public safety digital radio)• 
Analog AM/FM (MF, HF, VHF, UHF)• 
FM9000• 
Air Band Radio• 
Maritime Radios• 
Global Marine and Distress Safety System (GMDSS)• 
Satellite Networks
Inmarsat• 
Iridium• 
Mobile telephony systems
GSM (Global System for Mobile communications) – 2G• 
GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) x
CSD (Circuit Switched Data) x
EDGE (Enhanced Data rates for GSM Evolution) x
15  TETRA MoU Association, TETRA Security, www.tetramou.com, February 2006.
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UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) – 3G• 
CDMA (code division multiple access) x
HSDPA (High-Speed Downlink Packet Access) x
Wireless Computer networks
WLAN (Wireless Local Area Networks): WiFi (IEEE 802.11 a, b, g, h)• 
WPAN (Wireless Personal Networking): Bluetooth• 
WMAN (Wireless Metropolitian Area Network): WiMAX (IEEE 802.16)• 
The analyses of received questionnaires show that the wireless border communication networks 
use many different technologies. Providing the interoperability and security between these 
different networks is not an easy task. The interoperability between them can be provided if 
crucial technical information is known. Thus we purpose that further SeBoCom study gather 
detailed technical information about the wireless border communication networks in MSs and 
suggest technical solutions that provide communication between different networks.
On the other hand, the different technologies used in these networks increase the security 
threats, such as interference, and indirect connection to the network. Interferences can 
occur between different wireless transmission systems that share the same frequency band. 
Indirect connection to the border guard network can represent another major concern for 
security. Because ad hoc connections, such as WPAN, enable peer-to-peer networking between 
computers, an unauthorized user can be connected to the border network. This also allows 
an authorized user to transfer classified documents to the unauthorized user without going 
over the corporate network. These ad hoc connections make it difficult for security managers 
to monitor the activities in the wireless network and protect the border guard network from 
potential attacks. Therefore, the risk of them occurring is high. 
5.4.1  Main wireless border communication networks
The graph (Fig. 3) shows main PMR (Professional Mobile Radios) used for wireless border 
communications in MS. In this paper these systems are: TETRA, TETRAPOL, and APCO25. In 
accordance with the returned questionnaires TETRA is used by 10 MSs, TETRAPOL is used 
by 3 MSs, APCO25 by one MS, and two MSs are using both TETRA and APCO25. The graph 
(Fig. 3) shows the number of MSs (y-axis) that use the certain communication network. 
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Fig 3. The use of the main wireless border communication systems.
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The answers to the questionnaires show that TETRA is the most widely used PMR. Twelve 
countries are already using TETRA systems; among them six MSs explicitly express their intention 
to replace old wireless networks with TETRA systems. Some countries already have more 4000 
TETRA handheld terminals and 3500 vehicular terminals.
Because the implementation of a PMR like TETRA is important and expensive, we suggest that 
a further SeBoCom study will take into account that TETRA systems could be widely used in the 
future. Therefore, we also propose a further study which will determine if the exposures to the 
electromagnetic field generated by TETRA systems have a potential health impact16.
5.4.2  Operators of main wireless border communication systems
The main wireless border communication systems (TETRA, TETRAPOL, and APCO25) usually need 
more base stations and more expensive equipment than analog FM VHF systems. Therefore, some 
of them are operated by non government operators (3 of 11). In accordance with questionnaires 
the share of the main border communication systems operated by non government operators is 
shown on graph Fig. 4.
Government 
operator, 11
Non government 
operator, 3
Fig 4.  Government and non government operators of main 
wireless border communication systems. 
5.4.3  Wireless border computer networks
Wireless border communication networks could be connected to different wireless computer 
networks such as WMAN (Wimax), WLAN (WiFi), and WPAN (Bluetooth). In accordance with the 
questionnaires the most often used wireless computer networks are shown in graph (Fig. 5). 
16   Smith, R. N. et all, An Investigation of the Effects of the Airwave TETRA Signal on Cellular Calcium 
and Brain Function, Biomedical Sciences Dstl Porton Down, Salisbury, 2005.
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Fig. 5. Wireless border computer networks used in MS-s.
The nature of the radio waves exposes the computer networks to unwanted intruders and 
potential attacks. For example:
Steal the approved SSIDs and MAC addresses
In an ideal situation, the verification of an authorized user is based on the Service Set Identifiers 
(SSIDs) and the Media Access Control (MAC) addresses. They, respectively, act as crude passwords 
and personal identification numbers. However, due to the fact that they are not foolproof, it 
is easy for intruders to steal the approved SSIDs and MAC addresses to be able to connect to a 
WLAN as an authorized user. Apart from that, the nature of wireless transmission that travels 
as a radio wave makes it less complicated to pick up unencrypted messages and to decrypt 
encrypted messages using available hacking tools.
Flood the radio spectrum with static noise
Secondly, intruders who have been denied access to a WLAN can threaten to jam or flood the 
radio spectrum with static noise. This attack effectively disconnects stations from Access Points 
and consequently, shuts down the wireless network. The integrity of the network can also be 
abused by draining the connection speeds, hindering the overall WLAN performance. However, 
the possibility for it to occur is not very high.
5.5  Conclusions
Providing interoperability and security in the wireless border communication networks is not 
an easy task, especially if we take into account that these networks are used by various border 
security forces and other organizations; different types of information are relayed through 
these networks; different security functions are implemented in the networks (encryptions and 
authentications); the networks use various communication technologies; and the networks can 
be managed by various operators (government and non-government).
In order to provide interoperability between the different communication systems the crucial 
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technical information has to be known. Thus, we suggest that a further SeBoCom study gathers 
detailed technical information about the wireless border communication networks in MSs, to 
suggest technical solutions for communications between these networks.
Analysis of the questionnaires shows that many MSs using TETRA communications systems. 
Because this kind of the network could be very expensive, we suggest that a further study 
collects the experiences of the current implementations of the network in MSs.
On the other hand, the further study could provide successful examples how new wireless 
technology could improve border security, for example the networks can include different 
surveillance sensors or various services.
Considering that TETRA is widely used we propose a further study which will determine if 
the exposure to electromagnetic fields generated by TETRA systems has a potential health 
impact17.
17   Chadwick, P., Specific Absorption Rate Measurement in Vehicles, An Investigation of the Effect of the 
Airwave TETRA Signal on Cellular Calcium and Brain Function, Microwave Consultants Ltd, 2007. 
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6.  Way forWard - ConClusions 
The present document presents the following key findings:
presently there is little or no common vision for secure communications among the differ-1. 
ent bodies dealing with border security;
the existing communication infrastructures are quite different even within the same coun-2. 
try;
there is a large number of completed or ongoing studies aimed at defining communications 3. 
requirement for Public Safety, but there is none focused on the specific needs of Border 
Security;
plans for Secure Border Communications must focus both on Security and Interoperability.4. 
The above findings prompt the initiation of a study having the following main objectives:
Create and populate a database of the existing telecommunications infrastructures;1. 
Identify operational scenarios for the different situations which gain consensus from all 2. 
interested organizations;
Identify operational requirements, focusing on the specific needs of Border Security, in the 3. 
light of knowledge of the present technological state of the art and the legacy systems still 
in use;
Establish a permanent forum, managed by Frontex that officers from the relevant organiza-4. 
tions can use to share views and reach consensus on operational procedures.
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7.  ConClusions of The Workshop
During the Workshop, End Users presented their real life experience in Joint Operations and 
outlined their need for a reliable communication system in order to be able to perform their 
tasks, while Industries presented the state of the art of technology in the area of secure 
communications with specific reference to European Projects.
This bidirectional feed-in produced the following points of interest that define what should 
happen.
Interoperability, flexibility and reliability are crucial;• 
Defining a common procedure is the first step to achieve operational interoperability; • 
The focus is on functionalities and ease of use, rather than on technology;• 
An incremental approach would be favored against an overarching approach,  in order • 
to preserve existing investment and to have at least minimal functionalities as soon as 
possible;
Some representatives suggested the activation of ad hoc projects to help member states • 
solve specific issues (e.g.: to get TETRA network and a Tetrapol network to interoperate);
To be aware of new technologies, but to introduce them into the system only if they are • 
really necessary to cater for an operational need.
Further more, during the SeBoCom Workshop two proposals were put by respective MSs.
Maltese proposal•  
Frontex with the help of MSs ought to develop a manual / booklet regarding the common 
procedures / common ways of communication in Joint Operations.
German proposal•  
Germany proposed a pilot project. This project ought to provide equipment that would 
be tested to bridge different communication means of the participating MSs in a specific 
Joint Operation. In this way interoperable alternative solutions could be explored and the 
best “practices” defined.
These proposals, as well as other suggestions presented during the workshop, further reinforce 
the interest of Member States in SeBoCom in future carrying out a complete study to analyze 
the following subjects also:
Human aspects interacting with complex systems under stress, i.e. user friendly systems;• 
Level of skills of the users in conjunction with the introduction of solutions such as SDR and • 
the focus on simplification that they introduce.
Probable mandatory EU legislation implementing a unique “Communication System” in the • 
external borders (financial issues).
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9.  annex 1: QuesTionnaire
A. General Questions
Who will be the contact person for SeBoCom pre-study?1. 
Which are the agencies involved in Border Security (Coast Guard, Military Police, Army, 2. 
Custom Office, etc.)?
What is the “mission” of each agency [describe in few words the task of each agency with 3. 
reference to the agency needs for secure communications]?
What the numerical force (please detail the different tasks) of each agency?4. 
Do you plan to replace your existent radio communication system in the near future (within 5. 
3-5 years? If yes, which technology you are planning to acquire?
If your system supports data communications, please briefly describe what kind of data are 6. 
transmitted over the network.
Do you have surveillance sensors connected to the communication networks? if yes, please 7. 
describe them.
Are officers enabled to directly access sensors data [raw/filtered] on their handheld 8. 
devices?D
Does your organization already use any of the following technologies? 9. 
WiFi (IEEE 802.11 a,b,g,h) 
HyperLan 
WiMAX (IEEE 802.16 d, e) 
Bluetooth 
ZigBee  
Satellite Network
What type of wireless communication services do you need? 10. 
Group Calls 
Broadcast Calls 
Express Calls (push and talk) 
Fast setup call 
Emergency call 
Direct Mode of Operation 
Dispatcher (integration with call center) 
Trunking 
Audio-conferencing 
Text and Data Messaging 
GPS location integrated in the wireless terminal
Do you need to support different levels of security in your wireless communications 11. 
infrastructure? 
Do you need air interface encryption or end-to-end encryption ?12. 
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B.  Technical questions
a 1.  Technology: Please specify what technology is used by the radio network (networks) 
you are currently using [i.e. TETRA, Tetrapol, APCO25, etc.]  
a 2.  Operator of the Network: please specify if the Network is operated by a department of 
the border police (name of the department) or by an external body (please specify)
a 3.  Frequency used: please specify the frequency band (bands) used by the Network (i.e. 
380-395 MHz.)
a 4.  Organization that mainly uses the network: if the network is used only by the owner, 
just write the name of the owner, if the network is used by other organizations, please 
list them
a 5.  Contents: please specify whether the network is used for voice or data or both
a 6.  Number of Base Stations: please specify the number of Base Stations used in the 
Network
a 7.  Number of Switches: please specify the number of switches used in the Network
a 8.  Encryption standards used in the network: please specify the encryption standards used 
to guarantee the security of Network
a 9.  Authentication systems used in the network: please specify the systems used to 
authenticate the users of the Network (password, etc.)
a 10.  Security level: please specify the highest level of security for which the network is 
enabled
a 11.  Number of handheld terminals: please specify the number of handheld terminals used 
in the Network
a 12.  Number of vehicular terminals: please specify the number of Vehicular Terminals used 
in the Network
a 13.  Number of users: please specify the number of users utilizing the Network
a 14.  Percentage of external border: please specify the percentage of the external border 
“covered” by the network
If your organization uses also other radio communication networks, for each of them, please 
provide the following information:
b 1.  Technology: Please specify what technology is used by your radio network (networks) 
[i.e. TETRA, Tetrapol, APCO25, etc.] 
b 2.  Organization that mainly uses the network: if the network is used only by the owner, 
just write the name of the owner, if the network is used by other organizations, please 
list them
b 3.  Content: please specify whether the network is used for voice or data or both
b 4.  Interconnection: please describe how this network is interconnected to the other one 
(Gateway, Automatic switchboard, Manual switchboard, etc.).
SeBoCom Pre-Study 
A preliminary study on
Secure Border Communications 53
10.  annex 2: JoinT operaTion xxxx
General
Five Member States collaborate in a maritime surveillance joint operation along the coast 
of MSy1. JO XXXX deals with illegal migration in the YYY maritime borders of the European 
Union. The MSy1 Island and MSy2 Islands are facing an influx of irregular migrants from the YYY 
direction.
So, this operation aims specifically at creating a shared operation basis that is considered very 
critical for the improvement of co-operation and co-ordination.
Objectives
The main objectives are organizing and performing counter illegal immigration operations, carried 
out by assets of MSy1, MSy2, MSy3, MSy4, MSy5 and MSx2  ,enhancing flow of information among 
assets, competent departments and co-ordination centers through a secure communication 
network.
Execution
International Co-ordination Center:
The International Co-ordination Center will be set up at MSy1 with the following 
responsibilities:
Coordinate the development of maritime/air operations in respective operation areas; • 
Receive reports from assigned asset through the communications network, collect and • 
evaluate the data, and convey the relevant information to other National Coordination 
Centers;
Maintain continuous watch on maritime and air radio frequencies.• 
Director of the Centre will an MSy2 Senior Officer. 
Communication: 
Communications should be according to international or national regulations in force of the 
competent agencies of participating EU MS. 
These communications should be used for exchange of information according to the given 
priorities: e-mail; fax; telephone.  
More detailed plan of who communicate and with what is presented in the “communication 
Table of JO XXXX” in the end of this SCENARIO.
Assets employed:
The assets listed below will participate in Joint Operation XXXX. 
MSy1: one vessel type w1• 
MSy2: one vessel type w2 and one aircraft type z1• 
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MSy3: one helicopter type s1• 
MSy4: one vessel type l1 • 
MSy5: one vessel type k1• 
MSx2: one vessel type f1 and one aircraft p1• 
 
Area of operation:
The Joint Operation XXXX is going to be implemented within the following geographical area:
Maritime Assets:
Lat.  99°22’N  Lon. 99°00’E
        99°11’N   99°99’E
        99°33’N    99°09’E
        99°44’N                 99°90’E
Air Assets:
Lat.  99°55’N  Lon. 99°22’E
 99°66’N   99°11’E
 99°77’N    99°33’E
 99°88’N   99°44’E
Time of Operation:
Planed time/date of the operation is:
Start: at 88:88 UTC on 8/8/8888
End: at 99:99 UTC on 9/9/9999
Contact of operations; air patrolling; maritime patrolling:
Air patrolling is to be carried out by assigned air units. Contacts of interest will be forwarded by 
the air units, to ICC via radio frequencies (VHF or UHF). The average duration of flight missions 
will vary between “dd” and “ee” hours, according to the type of aircraft used.
Maritime patrolling is to be carried out by assigned naval units. Contacts of interest will be 
forwarded by the naval units, to ICC via radio frequencies (VHF or UHF) or satellite communication 
(Inmarsat). 
Reported incident:
At 99:99 UTC on 8/8/9999 a migrant boat was detected by aircraft “z1”. It informed vessel 
“w1” through UHF communications which accordingly informed ICC (through satellite means). 
ICC informed vessel “k1” patrolling in the specific area to follow the progression of migrant 
boat and try to identify: size, speed, course, activity and persons on board. The gathered 
information was transmitted to ICC via satellite phone, as follows:
Size: 5 m• 
Course: YYY North• 
Speed: 3 knots• 
Persons on board: 15• 
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In second encircle phase vessel “k1” sent an Investigating team with a boat to visually acquire 
additional information which is to be immediately relayed to the vessel.
The Investigating team didn’t make any physical or verbal contact with migrant boat. It 
transmitted to vessel through VHF the following information:
Rather good condition of persons on board• 
Probable existence of driver/facilitator • 
No further ship or other equipment facilitating the transportation• 
In third approach phase the migrant vessel was approached. Upon arrival next to the migrant 
boat, the Investigating team commander gave clear guidelines indicating his intentions in the 
following sequence: 
Request nationality of boat from the person driving the boat; • 
Request documentation of vessel from the person driving the boat to indicate proof of • 
ownership, registration and legality of voyage;
Gave life-jackets to all on board and order them to wear life-jackets;• 
Informed migrants that entering any EU Member State in this way is illegal and the organizers • 
of such illegal entry would be severely punished; 
Brief the people navigating the boat on the use of the equipment provided and remain • 
steaming parallel until they are heading on the correct course.
The actions undertaken were transmitted immediately through satellite phone to ICC.
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Abstract
This document contains the outcome of the SeBoCom pre-study. The main objective of the 
SeBoCom project was to define the way to proceed to a further and complete study. This 
task was to be achieved through this pre-study and through a Workshop involving end-users to 
stimulate the discussion and gain input regarding their needs.
This pre-study collects some initial data on the present Communications infrastructures outlining 
the co-existence of many different systems, some already based on digital technology, others 
outdated or quite obsolete.
One of the key finding of the present study is the need to define joint procedures to manage 
communications among different bodies belonging to different Member States: the most reliable 
and secure telecommunication infrastructure will be useless if there is no agreement on the 
type and structure of communications that are transmitted over the infrastructure.
The pre-study initially considers the pivotal role played by communications in Border Protection 
field operations, analyzing the different operational aspects.
It subsequently presents the state if the art of the communication infrastructures of Border 
Security Forces in Europe as well as the expected future scenarios obtained through questionnaires 
sent to the contact points in the Member States.
An initial broad view of the requirements for Secure Border Communications is outlined; this is 
followed by an analysis of the lessons learned in previous events; then a survey of the previous/
ongoing studies on similar topics is also presented.
The last chapters provide a Technology Survey and the conclusions based on the outcome of the 
pre-study and of the Workshop held in Ispra on May 27th and 28th 2008.
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